Predictive Policing and the Paris 2024 Olympic Games: Security vs. Freedom
As Paris prepares to host the 2024 Olympic and Paralympic Games from July 26 to August 11, 2024, the French government is implementing unprecedented surveillance measures to ensure safety. However, these measures have sparked fierce debate over the potential erosion of civil liberties, with opposition groups claiming that these systems automate social injustice.
Sporting mega-events, including the Olympic Games, have long been testing grounds for new surveillance technologies. Their exceptional size and security demands constitute an emergency situation which is used as a pretext to justify the accelerated implementation of extraordinary regulations and policies that temporarily suspend law, along with the adoption of legislation that would be otherwise very hard to pass during “normal” periods.
In the context of discussions on security and counter-terrorism for the Games, French members of Parliament adopted the “Bill on the 2024 Olympic and Paralympic Games“ on March 28, 2023.
Article 7 of the bill introduces Algorithmic Video Surveillance (AVS) into French law, which will remain in force beyond the Olympic Games. AVS automates the analysis of CCTV images through software that detects and reports events it has been trained to recognize. This includes identifying objects (e.g., trash, bags), people (e.g., lying on the ground, graffiti artists), and events (e.g., crossing a line).
France has thus become the first European Union member state to explicitly legalize such practices.
Translated sections of Article 7 read as follows:
“Article 7 of the Bill on the 2024 Olympic and Paralympic Games || I. – On an experimental basis and until June 30, 2025, for the sole purpose of ensuring the security of sporting, recreational or cultural events which, due to their scale or circumstances, are particularly exposed to risks of acts of terrorism or serious harm to personal safety, images collected by means of video-protection systems authorized on the basis of article L. 252-1 of the Internal Security Code and cameras installed on aircraft authorized on the basis of Chapter II of Title IV of Book II of the same code in and around venues hosting such events, as well as in means of transport and on the roads serving them, may be processed using an artificial intelligence system.
The sole purpose of such processing is to detect, in real time, predetermined events likely to present or reveal such risks, and to report them with a view to the implementation of the necessary measures by the national police and gendarmerie services, fire and rescue services, municipal police services and the internal security services of the SNCF and the Régie Autonome des Transports Parisiens.
(…)
III. – These processing operations do not use any biometric identification system, process any biometric data or implement any facial recognition technique. They may not be reconciled, interconnected or automatically linked with other personal data processing operations.
They only signal attention, strictly limited to indicating the predetermined event(s) they have been programmed to detect. They do not produce any other results, and cannot in themselves form the basis for any individual decision or legal actions.
They remain under the permanent control of those responsible for their implementation.”
Article 7 of the Bill on the 2024 Olympic and Paralympic Games
Civil Society’s Critique of Predictive Policing
While supposedly intended to enhance public safety, the reliance on automated analysis raises concerns about accuracy, bias, and potential over-policing. On March 7, 2023, shortly before the bill was voted on by the French parliament, a coalition of 38 civil society organizations published a public letter (PDF) criticizing these measures and accusing the French government of lying about not processing biometric data.
The coalition letter argues that the measures pose serious threats to fundamental civic freedoms and democratic principles, such as the right to freedom of assembly, expression and association, and the right to non-discrimination. They contend these measures undermine privacy and data protection and contravene the principles of necessity and proportionality. The objections highlight the lack of thorough evaluation, legislative oversight, and poor operational results of similar previous systems.
The French digital-freedoms advocacy group, La Quadrature du Net, argues that Article 7 did not emerge in isolation. It follows a trajectory from the declaration of a state of emergency in 2015 after the Paris terrorist attacks, that lasted two years, through to today. During this period, executive powers of the state administration were strengthened within an anti-terrorist framework and were later normalized as anti-terror laws, often targeting social movements. Within this permanent state of emergency policing has evolved towards what La Quadrature du Net calls Technopolice.
Since 2015, police databases have expanded, the taking of identifiers (DNA, fingerprints, facial photos) is systematically used on people in police custody, facial recognition has grown, metadata is used to track peoples habits, intrusive techniques like cell phone IMSI catchers are deployed against activists, surveillance drones are being widely used and social networks are censored and monitored. All the above creates a pervasive surveillance environment that operates in grey zones of the law.
A Big Window Opens for the AVS Industry
With Artificial Intelligence (AI) in the video surveillance market projected to grow from $6.5 billion in 2024 to $28.7 billion by 2030, a significant opportunity is opening for the French security industry. President Emmanuel Macron has often expressed his ambition in past years to position France as a leader in AI and establish it as a competitor to the U.S. and Chinese tech industries.
Article 7 boosts the sale of automated CCTV surveillance software to state and local authorities by private companies, marking a significant win for the French AVS industry.
The French National Research Agency, the Ministry of the Interior and the Olympic Organizing Committee 2024 awarded several French companies up to €500,000 in research funding to develop innovative security projects for the Olympic Games, according to an investigation by Technopolice, a campaign of La Quadrature du Net.
For this process of software development, the new legal framework provides these private companies with a huge volume of images coming from crowd analysis in public spaces in order to develop and train their algorithms.
Key big players in the French AVS industry like Thales, XXII, Two-I, and Neuroo will have the opportunity to sell biometric software to other states, just like the French multinational Idemia did when awarded a contract to supply facial recognition equipment directly to the Shanghai Public Security Bureau in 2015.
Future Implications
With such significant investments, infrastructure, and legal precedents, AVS technology will surely not disappear from French streets and stadiums post Olympic Games. Article 7 of the “Bill on the 2024 Olympic and Paralympic Games” paves the way for other biometric surveillance technologies, such as algorithmic audio surveillance, facial recognition, and biometric tracking.
Recent national elections may have kept the extreme right Rassemblement National from gaining power, with the leftist coalition New Popular Front securing a last-minute win, but concerns remain about how a future far-right government could exploit existing surveillance frameworks. The existing infrastructure and legal frameworks could be used to further invasive surveillance, raising alarms about the potential for even more extensive abuse.
Cover image by Niko Georgiades for Unicorn Riot – Creative Commons image of Olympic rings in Paris by Anne Jea.
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