Questions Remain After Syria – Rojava Integration Deal
On March 10, 2025 the Syrian transitional government inked a deal with the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) that will have them integrated into the Syrian military by the end of 2025. The agreement is part of wider efforts to unify and integrate all of Syria’s disparate rebel groups and the territories they control into one entity, following the rebel victory over the al-Assad dynasty earlier this year.
But behind the public gestures of goodwill and carefully choreographed photoshoots remains significant distrust and animosity within a Syrian society that is still reeling from over a decade of nearly constant civil war. While there’s been increasing progress in reconstruction efforts, the country itself is becoming increasingly divided along religious and sectarian lines. Many countries continued to take advantage of this, using it as an opportunity to penetrate deeper into Syria for their own benefit — the two most active and influential of these now being Turkey and Israel.
The stakes in ongoing negotiations between what many know as Rojava — or ‘West Kurdistan’ — and the transitional Syrian government are thus extremely high as the results will have wider implications not just for Syrians, but the Middle East and even the world. There are serious obstacles standing in the way however, namely the question of whether Turkey is truly prepared to cede Kurdish autonomy in northern Syria and release long imprisoned Kurdish revolutionary Abdullah Ocalan.
PKK disarmament may lead to Ocalan’s release; Extension of Erdogan’s Rule
Rojava has, at many times, declared its intention to be part of the wider Syria. A recent example of this is when it changed its flag to match that of the new Syrian government, as rebels led by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) marched into the capital Damascus virtually unopposed.
Despite the declarations of peace and unity from both sides, Rojava remains at odds with the Syrian transitional government on a number of key issues. These issues include the lack of diverse representation in senior government ministerial positions, the centralization of political power in Damascus as well as the overall dominance of former HTS members over the executive branch.
The continued presence and escalated activity of ISIL militants in northeast Syria is also playing a factor, as some Syrian Kurds allege that the transitional government is aiding the Islamic State group in order to further destabilize Rojava.
Though largely defeated, the Islamic State group continues to be active within certain pockets of northwestern Syria and has even experienced somewhat of a resurgence following the Syrian government collapse. This has enabled the U.S., Turkish and Russian military forces to justify their continued presence there.
But the more problematic issue may be over the estimated 50,000 or so men women and children being held in around 27 different detention facilities across northeastern Syria, based on their alleged affiliation with the Islamic State group. These prisoners were taken by the SDF after the large-scale defeat of the Islamic State group in 2019 and have since been rendered stateless as their former homelands refuse to take them back. Grave human rights abuses against these prisoners have been reported since by Amnesty International.
Another major factor influencing the planned integration of Rojava into Syria proper is the possible release of imprisoned Kurdish revolutionary, Abdullah Ocalan, in neighboring Turkey. Ocalan has been imprisoned on the island prison of Imrali for the past 26 years for his role in establishing the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) — a militant Kurdish left wing organization that’s been fighting for Kurdish autonomy against the Turkish state since 1984. Numerous ceasefires and negotiations between the PKK and Turkish government have occurred since.
However, more recent negotiations have made unprecedented strides after Ocalan issued a statement from prison calling on PKK fighters to lay down their arms and resolve the Kurdish question through democratic politics. PKK headquarters responded by immediately declaring a unilateral ceasefire — this was not respected by Turkish forces who continued to bomb targets in northern Iraq until, by their words: “the area is cleared and will no longer pose a threat to our country.”
The Turkish military is thus still conducting combat operations in northern Iraq, continuing to operate from a network of over 100 separate illegal military outposts based there. And as recently as July 7, Turkish casualties continued to mount as at least a dozen Turkish soldiers were recently killed in northern Iraq after being exposed to a lethal amount of methane gas in what was described as a former PKK cave complex. The Turkish military claims that the dead soldiers were trying to recover the body of a fallen soldier, and that the incident area had previously been the site of a PKK field hospital, without elaborating further.
Despite ongoing Turkish military operations against it, the PKK would ultimately follow through with Ocalan’s order holding an organizational congress that officially approved the dissolution of the organization on May 12.
A symbolic ceremony was subsequently held in northern Iraq on July 12 where 30 PKK fighters — 15 female and 15 male, all different ages and rank — proceeded down a mountain cliff to place a wide array of weapons into a large bowl before setting it alight. Party representatives made clear that the event was intended to communicate the PKK’s willingness to disengage from the armed struggle but that also now “the ball is in the other side’s court.“
Following that ceremony Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan acknowledged the historic events while warning that the order to disarm also applies to the PKK’s “extensions,” — more specifically the Syrian Democratic Forces in Rojava.
The SDF has meanwhile responded positively to Ocalan’s landmark statement, while countering that Ocalan’s call does not apply to them since the SDF is closely associated with, yet separate from, the PKK. Under the deal it signed with the Syrian government, the SDF is currently scheduled to integrate into the Syrian armed forces this year anyway, potentially making this a mute point, but that is by no means a certainty.
The Turkish government still won’t confirm what, if any, concessions it’s willing to give the PKK in exchange for disbanding. Turkey has historically refused to negotiate directly with the PKK, claiming to not “negotiate with terrorists,” instead promising, and so far, failing to destroy the group. But in recent years, they’ve steadily reversed course as Erdogan’s coalition partner, Devlet Bahceli, confirmed that Turkey was considering releasing Ocalan in exchange for PKK disarmament. This change in approach has largely been credited to ongoing negotiations between the Turkish far-right nationalist coalition that has long dominated Turkish government, and the liberal Kurdish opposition Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM), which is negotiating on behalf of Ocalan and the PKK.
It’s believed that Erdogan is lobbying the Kurdish liberals in Turkish Parliament for their support of a potential constitutional amendment that could lift presidential term limits allowing him to retain the presidency for at least five more years. Such a constitutional amendment can only be approved by a 2/3rds majority in parliament, which only DEM can provide. In exchange Turkey could release Ocalan, and grant amnesty to most former PKK fighters allowing them to participate in Turkish civilian life and even democratic politics again — a particular point that appears to be very contentious amongst those in Erdogan’s camp.
In a recent press conference it was announced that a Turkish parliament commission consisting of representatives of all three negotiation parties would be established to “start discussing the legal standards of this process,” indicating that the negotiation process will continue there.
Israel Enters the Chat
Adding even more gunpowder to this already volatile powder keg is the increasing rivalry brewing between neighboring Israel and Turkey. Both countries have a long relationship that traces beyond the founding of Israel itself. Turkey was one of the first countries to recognize the state of Israel a year after its official founding in 1948. Since then, the two have engaged in an often fraught, yet generally friendly relationship, exchanging billions of dollars worth of trade and arms deals to date.
Those friendly vibes and exchanges have since come to a complete halt in the aftermath of Israel’s war on Gaza and the ongoing humanitarian catastrophe it’s caused. This resulted in Turkey completely severing all trade and diplomatic relations with Israel last year. Some analysts believe that third-party countries are being used to conduct trade, but both governments claim direct trade has been zeroed out.
Gaza is not the only front that the Turks and Israelis have clashed on, as Syria has now become the main flashpoint between the two. While Turkish financial and military assistance has flooded into bolstering the Syrian transitional government, the Israelis have taken a more hostile and violent approach to the country.
During the rebel offensive that led to the final collapse of the al-Assad Dynasty, Israel quickly took advantage of the ensuing power vacuum by rapidly seizing at least 20 square miles of Syrian territory, particularly areas around the regional capital of Quneitra. This includes the entirety of the strategic Golan Heights, and its “buffer zone” beyond the area occupied since 1967.
The Israeli Air Force proceeded to carry out a massive bombing campaign over Syria, claiming to have destroyed most of the former Syrian army’s stockpile of heavy weapons. The Israelis also threatened the victorious HTS-led rebels, stating that their forces would not be allowed to operate south of Damascus — implying that any of them that do cross that line risk getting bombed by Israeli jets.
The Turkish air force has not taken kindly to their Israeli counterparts threatening and air striking their allies at will and very nearly came to blows over the issue when its pilots confronted Israeli air force jets over Syria. Though both countries agreed to establish a joint hotline to avoid such an incident happening again, the possibility of a direct military confrontation — accidental or otherwise — between Turkey and Israel has never been higher.
The Israelis have largely followed through with their threats, continuing to rain down massive amounts of bomb ordinance on a Syria they deem to be ruled by “terrorists,” striking Syria’s ground forces and Defense Ministry this week and bombing within close proximity of Syria’s presidential palace in Damascus on different occasions.
Israel has justified these bombings claiming to defend Syria’s religious and ethnic minority communities — especially the Druze and the Kurds. Some Israeli conservatives have even begun publicly calling for the Israeli military to invade Syria even further in order to create a buffer zone along Syria’s southern border to use as a supply route for weapons to Druze and Kurdish armed groups in what’s been dubbed the “Abraham Peace Corridor,” or “David’s Corridor“ depending on who you ask.
Both Druze and Kurdish groups in Syria have denied any direct coordination with Israel while also not ruling it out entirely, should negotiations with Turkey and the Syrian transitional government fail. When asked in a BBC interview whether he would accept Israeli support, Kurdish commander Mazloum Abdi indicated that he was open to the possibility if Israel could “prevent attacks against us and stop the killing of our people.”
Many within Israel’s establishment have long envisioned a “greater Israel” that spans well beyond Israel’s current borders; as far the Nile in Egypt, to the Euphrates River in Iraq. One such public proponent of this idea, comes from Oded Yinon, a writer for a well known right-wing Israeli media outlet who was attached to the Israeli foreign service in the 1980s.
Yinon published an opinion article in that newspaper which became the basis for the the aptly named “Yinon Plan” calling on Israel to intentionally cause ethnic conflict and divide the Middle East amongst various ethnic and religious lines in the interest of securing its dominance over the region. Similar plans from the Israeli right and their American supporters like the 1996 “Clean Break” paper have attracted attention over the years.
Though Israel has never publicly acknowledged or endorsed the Yinon Plan, some observers have noted it has implemented many of the same tactics and strategies outlined in the plan since. Israel thus continues to court close relationships with non-Arab groups throughout the Middle East, leaning on its own ethnic minority population to bolster this image.
Israel has also maintained a longtime, close yet informal relationship with the Iraqi Kurds — this could especially assist them in their efforts to court the Syrian Kurds. But despite the mutual flirtation there are significant barriers to such an alliance, most notably the SDF’s affiliation with the PKK, an explicitly leftist, militant and anti-Zionist organization that has engaged in direct combat with Israeli forces before. Ocalan himself has been clear on his continued opposition to Israel and support for the Palestinian cause and even reportedly claimed that he was the only one who could prevent the SDF from falling under Israel’s influence.
Conclusion
If the PKK and Turkish government actually reach a final settlement, it’ll put enormous pressure on the Syrians to do the same. But if they fail it could very well reignite one of the world’s longest running, inconclusive and destructive, quagmires’ to date.
The stakes are therefore extremely high, as the results will most impact the Syrian and Turkish people but will also ripple across the Middle East, and the world. The combatants have once again signaled that they’re tired of war and ready for peace; the question now being at what cost? While there’s no straightforward answer to this, the mere fact that most of the various factions involved are all willing to sit and talk may be the start to finding an answer.
If they can’t find that answer then a new phase of the Syrian civil war is likely to begin, the X factor this time being the potential for Israel’s increased involvement, and how the U.S. might respond. The Americans are, after all official “allies” of the Turks, Israelis and the Syrian Kurds, and if war does continue they will inevitably be forced to pick a side. For the time being, Syrians walk along hopeful, yet precarious crossroads not knowing exactly what the future brings, but also having more ability than ever to take control of their own destiny.
Cover image via the office of the Presidency of the Syrian Arab Republic.
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